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28 September 1960

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC


II. ASIA-AFRICA

Algeria--General Assembly almost certain to adopt resolution which goes beyond calling on parties to negotiate. ①

Buganda's demands for autonomy threaten to delay independence for Uganda. ②

Congo--Army group suggests round-table conference of political leaders. ③

Laos--Negotiations due to begin in Luang Prabang on compromise government. ④



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DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

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UN-Algeria: [The Algerian issue will probably provoke the most emotional debate--with the exception of the Congo--at this session of the General Assembly. The strong drive of the Algerian rebels' provisional government for a UN-conducted referendum, France's announced refusal to participate in the UN debates, and predominance of African and Asian members sympathetic to Algeria's cause make it almost inevitable that this General Assembly will adopt a resolution on Algeria. The resolution may go beyond a mere call for negotiations among the parties. Meanwhile, rebel premier Ferhat Abbas is reported to be en route to Peiping on his first visit to a Sino-Soviet bloc country.]

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Uganda: [Demands for autonomy by Buganda, the key province of the British East African protectorate of Uganda, threaten to embroil Uganda in a major political crisis and to set back London's plans for constitutional reform leading toward Uganda's early independence as a unified state. The Buganda provincial government has declared its secession from Uganda and announced a policy of non-participation in protectorate elections and legislative affairs. British authorities have stated clearly that they will not permit secession, and they reportedly are prepared to take strong action, including the removal of Buganda provincial cabinet ministers, to prevent it.]

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*Republic of the Congo: Pressure from elements of the Congolese Army for the institution of civil government appears to be undermining the position of army chief Joseph Mobutu. On 27 September, President Kasavubu accepted a plan advanced by an army group for a round-table conference of Congolese political leaders, including Lumumba and Katanga President Moise Tshombé. Lumumba quickly endorsed the projected meeting, and announced that he had himself invited various political leaders to the conference after an army delegation had urged that the government "start functioning again." Although Mobutu has sporadically labored to bring about a reconciliation between Kasavubu and Lumumba, the present effort appears to have been undertaken without his explicit concurrence. 0 / <

Lumumba's remarks suggest that he views a round-table conference as a means of reasserting his claim to the premiership. Although anti-Lumumba spokesman Joseph Ileo, in endorsing the conference, ruled out any re-establishment of the Lumumba government, it is likely that under present circumstances any successor to Mobutu's military government would be dominated by pro-Lumumba elements. 25X1

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*Laos: General Phoumi and Prince Boun Oum are due to arrive in Luang Prabang on 28 September to begin consultations with representatives of the Souvanna Phouma government looking to a compromise agreement. Resolution of the many points at issue between the two groups will be difficult, and further meetings may well be necessary. Meanwhile, Captain Kong Le remains in Vientiane, in a position to oppose any solution not to his liking. Vientiane's action in dropping what are believed to be token groups of paratroopers behind Phoumi's lines in southern Laos could harden the attitude of the Phoumi - Boun Oum group even before the Luang Prabang talks get under way. Preliminary reports of increased fighting between the Pathet Lao and the Lao Army in Phong Saly and Sam Neua provinces are too sketchy to permit an assessment of its severity. 25X1

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DAILY BRIEF

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15th UN General Assembly Likely to Adopt Resolution
On Algeria

[With the exception of the Congo, the Algerian issue will probably provoke the most emotional debate at this session of the General Assembly. The 13 new African members--although under strong French influence--are sympathetic to the Algerians' cause and some have already expressed their resentment of Paris' reported threat to break off aid if French Community states vote against France on Algeria. The strong drive of the Algerian rebel provisional government to gain support for a UN-conducted referendum, plus France's announced refusal to participate in the UN debate, may lead many UN members to support a resolution which goes beyond a mere call for negotiations among the parties concerned.]

[Although France's allies at best hope for a mild resolution, the Afro-Asian bloc--taking advantage of the unusual circumstances prevailing at this assembly--is likely to submit a draft resolution which not only incorporates the rebels' aims but also condemns France. While such a strong resolution probably would not gain the necessary two-thirds majority support, it is almost inevitable that this year's assembly will adopt some type of a resolution on Algeria. Last year's assembly failed by one vote to adopt a fairly mild one which called for negotiations.]

[Tunisia, the spearhead at the UN for the Algerian issue, is reported undecided whether to accept an alleged "offer" by the Algerian rebels to form an Algerian-Tunisian federation. According to the Turkish UN delegate, Tunis asserts that it might have to accept the offer if the "Western world continues to show a lack of interest in Tunisian problems." Tunisia also reportedly believes that Algeria may soon be forced to accept Chinese Communist help against French forces.]

[Rebel Premier Ferhat Abbas, heading a five-member delegation, is reported to be en route to Peiping on his first]

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[visit to a Sino-Soviet bloc country. The decision of Abbas, the outstanding pro-Western moderate among the rebel leaders, to attend the Chinese Communist national day observance on 1 October apparently is a pointed gesture designed to impress Western governments that the rebels are determined to "accept aid whenever they can find it."]


[French support of the UN has been steadily deteriorating as the issues of Algeria and, more recently, French nuclear testing have subjected France to increasingly hostile international criticism. De Gaulle's slighting references to the UN in his 5 September press conference were probably designed to condition the French public to defeat on the Algerian issue this year. Paris can be expected to refuse to take cognizance of any UN resolution, although protests will probably be forthcoming to all allies of France which fail to vote against "outside interference" in the Algerian problem.]

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Political Crisis Developing in Uganda

The renewed efforts of the traditional rulers of Buganda--the key region of Uganda protectorate--to assure their political future is creating a major colonial crisis for Britain. London's efforts to push constitutional reform in Uganda may bog down if the Buganda rulers are not persuaded to participate in the protectorate's political life and abandon efforts to establish an independent state within a weak Uganda federation.]

Discussions in London between Buganda and British officials deadlocked in mid-September when the Africans broke off the talks because of dissatisfaction with London's promises to safeguard their province's separate political identity. Provincial leaders, who have backing from three other tribal rulers in Uganda, fear that the elections planned by Britain for next February would undermine the royal regime in Buganda.]

On 21 September the provincial legislature denounced local electoral registration and also opposed increasing the power of the Uganda protectorate government to deal with intimidation of the voters in any region. On 23 September the legislature voted to terminate the Buganda agreement with Britain--in effect declaring Buganda's secession from Uganda--and appointed a committee to set the date of independence.]

Britain is expected to react sharply to these moves. The second-ranking British official in Uganda expects a crisis and believes it is better to have it quickly before the rest of the protectorate becomes further involved. He has hinted that the government will use its reserve powers to remove Buganda ministers. On 26 September he publicly announced that London would not permit Buganda to change the basic protectorate agreements unilaterally, would not recognize any secession so long as Britain governs Uganda, and would not consider any constitutional change at this time.]

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Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

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